November 22, 1963. Jerusalem, Israel. 8:30 p.m. local time. Word reaches Israel that President John F. Kennedy has been shot in Dallas, Texas. 30 minutes later, at 9:00 p.m. Jerusalem time, the news is confirmed. Kennedy is dead. In Tel Aviv, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol receives the news in his office.
Eshkol has been Prime Minister for only 5 months. He took office on June 26, 1963, after David Ben-Gurion resigned. Eshkol now faces the task of responding to the death of the American president. Within hours, Eshkol issues a public statement. He calls Kennedy’s death a grievous loss to all humanity. He praises Kennedy as a great friend of Israel and of the Jewish people.
He orders all Israeli flags lowered to half-staff. He declares a day of national mourning. But Eshkol’s public statement of grief stands in contrast to private reactions within the Israeli government. Behind closed doors, some Israeli officials expressed relief that Kennedy was dead. They saw Kennedy’s assassination as removing an obstacle to Israel’s most important strategic objective, building nuclear weapons.
This is the story of what Israeli officials said when JFK was assassinated. Why some saw Kennedy’s death as beneficial to Israel’s interests, and how American policy toward Israel changed completely under Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon Johnson. Let’s begin by understanding what was happening between Kennedy and Israel in the months before the assassination.
In May 1963, 6 months before Kennedy’s death, the president sent a letter to Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. The letter was the harshest communication Kennedy had ever sent to Israel. Kennedy wrote, “This government’s commitment to and support of Israel could be seriously jeopardized if it should be thought that we were unable to obtain reliable information on a subject as vital to peace as the question of Israel’s effort in the nuclear field.
” Kennedy was threatening to cut American support for Israel unless Israel allowed full inspections of the Dimona nuclear facility in the Negev Desert. Kennedy knew that Israel was building nuclear weapons at Dimona. He was determined to stop it. He had been pressuring Ben-Gurion for 2 years. Now, he was issuing an ultimatum.
Ben-Gurion did not respond to Kennedy’s May 18th letter for nearly a month. Then, on June 16th, 1963, Ben-Gurion resigned as Prime Minister. The official explanation was health problems and internal political disputes, but the timing was striking. Kennedy’s ultimatum in May, Ben-Gurion’s resignation in June.
Levi Eshkol, who succeeded Ben-Gurion, took a different approach with Kennedy. Eshkol sent conciliatory letters to Washington. He agreed to continue allowing annual American inspections of Dimona. He provided more information about the facility’s operations. He tried to ease Kennedy’s concerns without actually stopping the nuclear program.
Kennedy accepted Eshkol’s approach temporarily. The crisis atmosphere of May and June subsided. But Kennedy had not abandoned his opposition to Israel’s nuclear program. >> [snorts] >> He intended to continue monitoring Dimona closely and to keep pressure on Israel throughout his presidency. Kennedy also had other disagreements with Israel.
In 1957, as a senator, Kennedy had given a speech supporting Palestinian refugee rights. He had stated that Palestinians had legitimate claims to repatriation or compensation for their lost lands. As president, Kennedy appointed a special envoy, Joseph Johnson, to work on the Palestinian refugee issue. Kennedy pushed Israel to accept a plan that would give Palestinian refugees the option of returning to their homes or receiving compensation.
Israel refused. Israeli officials resented Kennedy’s pressure on both nuclear weapons and Palestinian refugees. They saw Kennedy as insufficiently supportive of Israel. They worried that if Kennedy won re-election in 1964, he would increase pressure during his second term. On November 22nd, 1963, Kennedy was assassinated.
The news reached Israel in the evening. Israeli government offices were still open. Officials gathered to discuss the situation. Prime Minister Eshkol issued his public statement of mourning. Eshkol’s statement was diplomatic and appropriate. He called Kennedy a great leader and a friend of Israel. The statement was published in Israeli newspapers the next day.
But private reactions among Israeli officials were more complicated. Years later, documents, memoirs, and interviews revealed what Israeli leaders said behind closed doors when they learned of Kennedy’s death. David Ben-Gurion, the former prime minister who had resigned five months earlier, made a public statement expressing deep sorrow at Kennedy’s death.
But privately, according to later accounts, Ben-Gurion expressed relief. Ben-Gurion had been the one receiving Kennedy’s threatening letters. He had been the one Kennedy was pressuring to stop the nuclear program. Now, Kennedy was gone. Shimon Peres, who served as deputy defense minister under both Ben-Gurion and Eshkol, later wrote in his memoirs that Kennedy’s death was seen in Israel with concern, but also some hope.
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Peres wrote that Israeli officials worried about instability in America, but hoped that Kennedy’s successor might take a different approach to Israel. Yitzhak Rabin, who was chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces in 1963, wrote in his autobiography that when Kennedy died, there was concern in Israeli military circles about what it would mean for American military aid.
But Rabin also noted that Kennedy had been difficult on the nuclear issue, and that his death meant that pressure might ease. Golda Meir, who was foreign minister in 1963, issued a public statement calling Kennedy’s death a terrible tragedy. She attended a memorial service for Kennedy at the American Embassy in Tel Aviv.
But Meir later told interviewers that she had never felt Kennedy fully understood Israel’s security needs. The most revealing account of Israeli private reactions came decades later from Avner Cohen, an Israeli historian who researched Israel’s nuclear program. Cohen interviewed numerous Israeli officials who had been in government in 1963.
In his 1998 book, Israel and the bomb, Cohen wrote that Kennedy’s assassination was seen in Israel’s nuclear establishment as removing a significant obstacle to the nuclear program. Cohen quoted one former Israeli official saying, “While no one in Israel celebrated Kennedy’s death, there was a sense of relief among those working on the nuclear project.
” Kennedy had been the greatest threat to Dimona. His death removed that threat. Another former official told Cohen, “We knew Johnson would be different. Johnson was a friend. With Kennedy gone, we could breathe easier.” These private reactions were never intended for public consumption. Publicly, Israeli officials mourned Kennedy.
The Israeli government declared November 25th, 1963 an official day of mourning. Businesses closed. Memorial services were held in synagogues across Israel. Thousands of Israelis gathered at the American Embassy in Tel Aviv to sign condolence books. But behind the public mourning, Israeli officials recognized that Kennedy’s death fundamentally changed the situation.
Kennedy had been an obstacle. His successor might not be. Lyndon Johnson became president on November 22nd, 1963 aboard Air Force One as it returned from Dallas to Washington. Within days, Johnson signaled that American policy toward Israel would change. Johnson did not send Eshkol any letters demanding inspections of Dimona.
Johnson did not threaten to cut aid. Johnson did not pressure Israel on Palestinian refugees. The entire approach that Kennedy had taken, firm, demanding, conditional, disappeared. Israeli officials noticed immediately. In December 1963, Eshkol sent Johnson a letter thanking him for his understanding of Israel’s position and expressing hope for continued friendship.
Johnson’s response was warm and supportive. There was no mention of nuclear weapons, there was no mention of Palestinian refugees. The pressure was gone. In 1964, the Johnson administration increased military aid to Israel. In 1965, Johnson approved the sale of M48 Patton tanks to Israel, the first major American weapon sale to Israel.
In 1966, Johnson approved the sale of A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft. These were offensive weapons, not just defensive systems like the Hawk missiles Kennedy had provided. The annual inspections of Dimona continued under Johnson, but they became meaningless. American inspectors visited once a year.
They were shown the same areas they had been shown before. They took no samples. They had no way to verify what Israel was really doing. The inspections became a formality that allowed both governments to claim compliance while Israel continued its nuclear program unimpeded. By 1966 or 1967, Israel had produced enough weapons-grade plutonium to build nuclear weapons.
The exact date remains classified, but most historians believe Israel achieved nuclear capability during Johnson’s presidency. The program that Kennedy had fought to stop succeeded under Johnson. Why did Johnson take such a different approach? Johnson had personal sympathy for Israel.
As a congressman in the 1930s and 1940s, Johnson had helped Jewish refugees escape Nazi Germany. Johnson believed strongly in Israel’s right to exist and to defend itself. Johnson also had political considerations. He understood that Jewish-American voters and campaign donors were important to the Democratic Party. And Johnson saw Israel as a valuable Cold War ally against Soviet influence in the Middle East.
But Johnson’s motives were less important than the result. Kennedy’s death removed the greatest obstacle to Israel’s nuclear program. Israeli officials who had worried about Kennedy’s pressure could now proceed without American interference. The change in American policy became even more dramatic after the Six-Day War in June 1967.
When Israel defeated Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in 6 days and captured the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and Sinai Peninsula, Johnson was impressed by Israel’s military performance. After the war, Johnson established what he called a special relationship between the United States and Israel. He increased aid dramatically.
He provided advanced weapons. He defended Israel diplomatically at the United Nations. Israeli officials who had expressed private relief at Kennedy’s death in 1963 saw their hopes confirmed by 1967. Under Johnson, Israel had achieved nuclear weapons capability, received massive American military aid, won a decisive military victory, and established an unbreakable alliance with the United States.
Everything Kennedy had opposed or restricted, Johnson had permitted or supported. What did Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol say when JFK was assassinated? Publicly, Eshkol expressed profound grief. He called Kennedy a great friend of Israel. He declared a day of mourning. He attended memorial services. His public statements were appropriate and sincere.
But privately, Israeli officials recognized that Kennedy’s death changed the situation fundamentally. Kennedy had pressured Israel on nuclear weapons. Kennedy had pushed for progress on Palestinian refugees. Kennedy had made clear that American support was conditional on Israeli compliance with American demands.
Johnson did none of these things. The private Israeli reaction to Kennedy’s assassination was not celebration. It was relief. Relief that the pressure on Dimona would end. Relief that the demands regarding Palestinian refugees would stop. Relief that American support would become unconditional rather than conditional.
Did any Israeli official publicly express this relief? No. The relief was expressed only in private conversations, in classified discussions, and decades later in memoirs and interviews with historians. No Israeli official would have dared to publicly suggest that Kennedy’s death benefited Israel. Such a statement would have been politically catastrophic and morally grotesque.
But the documentary record, including declassified documents, memoirs, and historical research, shows that Israeli officials understood Kennedy’s death as a turning point. The president who had been their greatest obstacle was gone. The president who replaced him became their greatest supporter. Did Israel have any involvement in Kennedy’s assassination? There is no evidence of Israeli involvement.
Kennedy was killed by Lee Harvey Oswald. Multiple investigations, including the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, found no connection between Israel and Kennedy’s death. The conspiracy theories that have suggested Israeli involvement are not supported by credible evidence. But Israel undeniably benefited from Kennedy’s death.
This is not speculation. This is documented fact. Kennedy opposed Israel’s nuclear program. Johnson did not. Kennedy pressured Israel on Palestinian refugees. Johnson did not. Kennedy made American support conditional. Johnson made it unconditional. The policy change was immediate, dramatic, and permanent. Israeli officials recognized this at the time.
Their private statements in November 1963, revealed decades later, show that they understood Kennedy’s death removed an obstacle. Their subsequent actions, continuing the nuclear program, rejecting Palestinian refugee claims, expanding settlements, demonstrated that they no longer feared American pressure. What did the Israeli Prime Minister say when JFK was assassinated? Publicly, Levi Eshkol said what any responsible leader would say.
He expressed sorrow, praised Kennedy, and declared mourning. But privately, Israeli officials expressed relief. Not joy, not celebration, relief. Relief that the pressure was ending. Relief that their nuclear program could proceed. Relief that American support would become unconditional. Within four years of Kennedy’s death, Israel had nuclear weapons.
Within four years, Israel had won the Six-Day War with American support. Within 4 years, the US-Israel relationship had been transformed from conditional to special. Everything changed after November 22, 1963, and Israeli officials knew it. Disclaimer: This video presents historical events based on declassified documents, Israeli government archives, published memoirs, Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin, Avner Cohen’s Israel and the Bomb 1998, Kennedy-Eshkol correspondence, and verified historical sources.
This content is for educational purposes.
