At 1:35 p.m. on May 19th, 1944, Lieutenant Commander Walton Pendleton stood in the cramped combat information center of USS England, watching his sonar operator track a contact moving at four knots beneath the black waters north of the Solomon Islands. 46 years old, 23 years in the Navy, zero submarine kills.
Fleet radio unit Pacific had intercepted a Japanese message 3 days earlier. Submarine I16 was carrying rice supplies to Japanese troops at Buouan. The codereers at Pearl Harbor had cracked the schedule, the position, even the route. USS England was a Buckley class destroyer escort, 1,400 tons, 306 ft long, one quarter the size of a fleet destroyer.
The Navy had built these ships to escort convoys, not to hunt submarines. The brass called them expendable, cheap warships for cheap missions. England carried a weapon most Navy officers considered experimental garbage, the Hedgehog, a mortar system that fired 24 spigot bombs ahead of the ship in a circular pattern.
Each projectile weighed 65 lb with a 35lb Torpex warhead fuse. If the bomb missed, nothing happened. If it hit, the submarine died. Traditional depth charges had a kill ratio of 60 to1. 60 attacks for every confirmed sinking. The hedgehog had managed 6 to1 in limited trials, but most captains preferred depth charges.
At least depth charges made noise, created turbulence, made submariners afraid. The hedgehog just plopped into the water and sat there waiting to hit something. Pendleton had practiced hedgehog attacks for 4 months. His executive officer, Lieutenant John Williamson, had drilled the crew relentlessly.
Fire control, sonar tracking, range calculation, attack patterns. England had never fired a hedgehog in combat, never sunk anything larger than a practice target. The Imperial Japanese Navy had deployed 25 submarines across the Pacific in May 1944. Seven of those boats formed a picket line designated NA, positioned between the Admiral T islands and truck, waiting to detect American carrier movements, waiting to ambush Admiral Hallyy’s third fleet.
American codereers knew the entire plan. every submarine position, every patrol sector, every communication schedule. Commander Hamilton Haynes had ordered a three- ship hunter killer group to roll up the Japanese line from south to north. USS George, USS Rabby, USS England. England was the smallest ship in the group, the newest, the least experienced.
George and Rabbi had been hunting submarines for 6 months. England had been escorting cargo ships. The sonar contact held steady, range closing. I-16 was running submerged at periscope depth. Standard evasion pattern for a supply submarine trying to avoid detection. Pendleton ordered the first hedgehog attack at 1341.
24 projectiles arked through the air, splashed into the Pacific in a circle 200 ft across, sank toward the submarine at a steep angle. Nothing happened. The bombs missed. The submarine continued on course. Pendleton ordered a second attack. The hedgehog fired again. One projectile struck I-16 at a depth of 130 ft. A single detonation, then silence.
Pendleton ordered a third attack. Missed. The fifthometer showed I-16 had gone deeper. 325 ft below the assumed depth. The submarine commander was good, experienced. He knew how to evade. The fourth attack missed. I16 outmaneuvered the pattern. 45 minutes had passed since first contact.
Pendleton had fired four hedgehog salvos. 96 projectiles, zero kills. If you want to see how England’s unconventional weapon turned out, please hit that like button. It helps us share more forgotten stories from the Pacific War. Subscribe if you haven’t already. Back to England. Pendleton ordered a fifth attack at 1433.
24 more projectiles. The sonar operator reported breaking up noises 3 seconds after impact. Four to six detonations. Then a massive underwater explosion lifted England’s stern and knocked men off their feet. I16 was gone. 1,700 tons of steel and 57 Japanese submariners settling toward the ocean floor.
England had her first kill, but five attacks to sink one submarine was not efficient, not fast enough, not good enough. Seven more Japanese submarines waited ahead on the NA line. Pendleton knew the codereers would find them. He knew Commander Haynes would send England to attack and he knew the next submarine commander might be better than the last.
Lieutenant John Williamson assembled the fire control team in England’s wardroom at 2100 hours on May 19th. Five attacks to kill I16. 96 hedgehog projectiles expended. Only four to six hits. The math was brutal. Williamson spread the attack charts across the table. Each hedgehog salvo created a circular pattern approximately 200 f feet in diameter, but the pattern varied with ship speed, seaate, and roll angle.
The first attack had landed too far ahead. The second caught I-16 at shallow depth. The third and fourth missed because the submarine went deep and the range calculation was wrong. The problem was timing. Sonar could track a submarine until the range closed to about 400 yd. Then the contact entered the blind spot.
The echo merged with the transmission pulse. The submarine disappeared from sonar exactly when England needed tracking data most. Traditional doctrine called for dropping depth charges when the submarine passed under the ship, but the hedgehog fired forward while sonar still held contact. The projectiles landed 250 yd ahead, hit the water before the submarine reached the impact zone.
If the submarine changed course or depth during those critical seconds, the attack failed. Williamson calculated the solution. Fire earlier. Tighten the pattern. Reduce the interval between sonar contact and weapon impact. Give the submarine less time to maneuver. Pendleton approved the new attack procedure, but changing doctrine was easy.
Executing it in combat against experienced submarine commanders was different. The hedgehog mechanism itself presented problems. Each spigot mortar sat in a steel cradle on England’s for deck. The launcher could rotate to track the target bearing, but the elevation was fixed. The projectiles always fired at the same angle, always landed at roughly the same range.
The only variables England could control were ship speed, course, and firing timing. Change any of those parameters by even a few seconds, and the entire pattern shifted. Hit the wrong wave angle during launch, and half the projectiles scattered outside the effective zone. Williamson drilled the crew on the new procedure. Sonar operators practiced tracking shallow contacts.
Fire control teams rehearsed range calculations. Helmsmen learned to hold steady course during the attack run despite submarine evasion tactics. 24 hedgehog projectiles cost approximately $6,000. One torpedo cost 10,000. But torpedoes required fire control solutions, gyro angles, depth settings. The hedgehog just needed the submarine to be in the circle when the bombs arrived.
The weapon had another advantage. Depth charges lacked. Silence. When a hedgehog salvo missed, nothing exploded. The water remained calm. Sonar performance stayed clear. England could fire again immediately without waiting for turbulence to settle. But when a hedgehog hit, the result was catastrophic.
A 65lb projectile traveling at terminal velocity punched through a submarine’s pressure hole like a rifle round through sheet metal. The 35lb Torpex warhead detonated inside the hole. At 300 ft depth, seawater flooded through the brereech at 400 gall per minute. Most submarines sank in under 90 seconds.
Fleet radio unit Pacific transmitted another decoded intercept. On May 20th, the Japanese 7th Submarine Squadron had established the NA picket line exactly where the code breakers predicted. Seven ROC class submarines. RO104, RO 105, RO106, RO108, RO109, RO112, RO116. Spaced at intervals across a route Admiral Hally had used twice before.
Commander Haynes ordered the Hunter killer group north, England would sweep the line from south to north, find each submarine, kill it, move to the next position. Pendleton knew the tactical problem. Seven submarines across 200 miles of ocean. Most of them would be running submerged during daylight surfaced only at night to recharge batteries.
England would need to catch them during the narrow window when they were vulnerable. The rowclass boats were smaller than I6. 765 tons submerged. Crews of 54 men. Top speed 8 knots underwater. They carried contact mines and four torpedo tubes. Their mission was reconnaissance and early warning, not direct combat.
But small submarines were harder to detect, generated less noise, created smaller sonar signatures, and their commanders knew American hunter killer groups were operating in the area. They would be cautious, alert, ready to evade. Williamson reviewed the crew assignments one final time. Every man knew his position.
Every station had been drilled until the procedures became automatic. England had proven the hedgehog could kill submarines. Now they needed to prove they could do it consistently. At 0350 on May 22nd, USS George’s radar detected a surface contact 11,000 yd north of the Admiral T Islands. The contact submerged immediately when George illuminated it with search lights.
Commander Haynes ordered England to attack. RO106 was waiting below. England regained sonar contact on Row 106 at 4:25 a.m. on May 22nd. Range 1,800 yards. The submarine was running at periscope depth, trying to determine what had triggered the radar contact, whether the Americans knew its position. Pendleton ordered the first hedgehog attack using Williamson’s modified procedure.
Fire earlier, tighter timing, less interval between sonar contact and weapon impact. The hedgehog Salvo missed. 24 projectiles splashed into the Pacific and sank without detonating. Row 106’s commander had changed course the moment the submarine submerged. Standard evasion. The pattern landed in empty water.
Pendleton ordered a second attack at 501. England’s sonar operator called out the range. Bearing depth estimate. Williamson calculated the firing solution in his head. adjusted for the submarine’s last known course change. 24 projectiles arked forward. The pattern landed perfectly. Three detonations, then four more.
Row 106’s pressure hole ruptured in seven places simultaneously. The submarine imploded at 260 ft. A massive underwater explosion followed 3 seconds later as the batteries shorted and ignited. England had killed her second submarine. Two attacks instead of five. 48 projectiles instead of 96. Williamson’s procedure worked.
Oil and debris surfaced after sunrise. A massive slick spread across three square miles. USS George and USS Rabbi formed a search line with England 16,000 yards between ships, scanning for the next contact on the NA picket line. Japanese submarine Row 104 was positioned 40 m northeast. Lieutenant Commander Tekashi Hashimoto commanded the boat, 17 years in the Imperial Navy, eight war patrols.
He had survived depth charge attacks off Guadal Canal, evaded American destroyers near Rabbal. He knew the Americans were hunting the NA line. He knew row 106 had stopped transmitting. Hashimoto kept RO 104 deep during daylight, 300 ft, running silent, minimal speed, listening for propeller noise, sonar pings, anything that indicated American warships approaching. At 7:17 a.m.
on May 23rd, USS George detected RO 104 on sonar. Commander Haynes ordered George to attack. The first Hedgehog Salvo missed. George fired again at 7:30. Missed. Another attack at 7:45 missed. Two more salvos by 810. Both missed. George had expended 120 hedgehog projectiles. Five attacks. Zero hits. Hashimoto was good.
He changed depth and course unpredictably. Stayed inside George’s sonar blind spot. Evaded every pattern. Commander Haynes ordered England to take over the attack. Pendleton brought the destroyer escort around to the attack heading. Williamson stood next to the sonar operator, tracking the contact, calculating the geometry.
Hashimoto had established a pattern. Deep dive after each attack, level off, change course, wait for the water to settle, surface slightly to check for pursuers. England’s first hedgehog attack missed. Hashimoto went deep again. But Williamson had predicted the evasion. He knew where the submarine would level off, knew the approximate depth, knew the bearing Hashimoto would choose.
Pendleton ordered the second attack at 8:34. The hedgehog fired. 24 projectiles dropped into the predicted zone. 10 detonations, then 12. The sound echoed across the water like a string of firecrackers. Underwater microphones picked up the noise of RO104’s hull breaking apart, bulkheads collapsing, pressure hole fracturing.
A major explosion followed 3 minutes later. Debris appeared on the surface at 10:45. oil, cork insulation, wooden fragments, personal items. 54 Japanese submariners gone. England had killed three submarines in four days. The new attack procedure was proving consistent, but Commander Haynes faced a problem.
USS George had failed five consecutive attacks against RO 104. USS Rabby had not successfully prosecuted a single submarine contact since the operation began. England was carrying the entire Hunter killer group. The remaining submarines on the NA line would know the Americans were coming.
Radio silence had been broken. RO 106 and RO 104 had missed their scheduled transmissions. Japanese submarine headquarters at truck would assume the worst, would warn the surviving boats, would order them to abort the picket line and scatter. But fleet radio unit Pacific intercepted another message on May 24th.
RO116 was maintaining position, still waiting to detect American carrier movements, still following orders despite the missing submarines. The Japanese command either did not believe the Americans could roll up the entire line, or they considered the intelligence mission too important to abandon.
USS George detected RO116 on radar at 120 a.m. on May 24th. Surface contact. The submarine dove immediately. Commander Haynes ordered England to attack. Pendleton was already calculating the approach. England made sonar contact on row 116 at 150 a.m. on May 24th. Range 2,000 y. The submarine was running shallow, trying to reach deeper water before the Americans could establish an attack pattern.
Pendleton ordered the first hedgehog attack at 214, the modified procedure Williamson had developed. Early firing, tight timing, predicted evasion zone. 24 projectiles landed in a perfect circle. Three detonations, then five more. Row 116’s pressure hull fractured. The submarine went down with all 56 crew.
Breaking up noises followed immediately, but no major explosion. The battery compartment remained intact during the descent. England had killed four Japanese submarines in six days. Four successful hedgehog attacks out of eight attempts, 50% kill ratio. Traditional depth charge operations achieved less than 2%.
A small oil slick appeared after sunrise at 702. The slick expanded to several square miles by the following day. Commander Haynes transmitted the results to Third Fleet headquarters. Admiral William Holsey forwarded the report to Pearl Harbor, to Admiral Chester Nimttz, to the chief of naval operations in Washington.
The Navy had been skeptical of the Hedgehog since its introduction in 1942. Most destroyer captains considered the weapon unreliable, preferred proven depth charge tactics. But England’s performance was changing opinions rapidly. Destroyer escort commanders throughout the Pacific began requesting hedgehog installation.
Ships that already carried the weapons started practicing the attack procedures Williamson had developed. Fire control officers studied England’s attack geometry. Sonar operators analyze the timing intervals. The Bureau of Ordinance in Washington received requests for additional hedgehog projectile production.
Ammunition depots across the Pacific reported increased demand. Ships that had ignored their hedgehog launchers for months suddenly wanted spare parts. Training ammunition, technical manuals. But England was not finished hunting. Fleet radio unit Pacific had decoded another intercept. RO 108 was maintaining position 110 nautical miles northeast of Seadler Harbor at Manis Island.
The submarine was following the original operational plan, waiting for American carriers. Unaware that four submarines on the NA line had already been destroyed, USS Rabbi gained radar contact on RO 108 at 2303 on May 26th. Surface contact at 15,000 yd. The submarine dove before Ra could close the range.
England detected the submerged contact at 2320. Commander Haynes decided to give Rabi the attack. England had killed four submarines. George and Rabby had killed none. The crews were becoming demoralized, questioning their training, their equipment, their ability to prosecute contacts effectively. Rabby fired the first hedgehog salvo. Missed.
The submarine evaded the pattern. Ra attacked again. Missed. Commander Haynes watched from USS George, counting the attacks. Watching Rabies struggle with the same problems George had faced against RO 104. After Rabby’s second miss, Haynes ordered England to finish the attack. Pendleton brought the destroyer escort into position.
Williamson calculated the firing solution. The crew executed the attack procedure they had practiced dozens of times. England fired at 2323. The hedgehog pattern landed precisely. Four detonations, then six more. RO 108 imploded at 300 ft. 53 Japanese submariners died. England had killed five submarines in eight days.
The Japanese 6th Fleet intelligence section at Trrook intercepted American radio transmissions on May 27th. The broadcasts described multiple submarine sinkings north of the Admiral T Islands. The intelligence officers decoded enough fragments to understand what was happening. American forces were systematically destroying the NA picket line.
Sixth Fleet Headquarters transmitted warnings to the surviving submarines. Row 112 and row 109 received the message. Both boats immediately abandoned their patrol sectors. Row 112 moved west toward the Philippines. Row 109 headed south. Both submarines would survive until 1945 before being sunk by other American forces, but one submarine on the NA line did not receive the warning in time.
Row 105 had sorted from Saipan on May 14th under Lieutenant Junichi Ino. The boat carried the commander of submarine division 51, Captain Rionoske Katoau. A flag officer embarked for tactical oversight. Row 105 was the most experienced submarine remaining on the NA line. In no way had evaded American torpedoes in August 1943, had fired on USS Colombia without success in September.
had rescued down Japanese aviators on multiple occasions. Captain Kado had commanded submarine operations throughout the Solomon Islands campaign. The American radio transmissions described as increasingly jubilant by Japanese intelligence were accurate. Admiral Hally sent a personal message to Commander Haynes.
Continue the sweep. Find the remaining submarines. Destroy them. England had proven the hedgehog could kill consistently. had demonstrated that destroyer escorts could hunt submarines as effectively as fleet destroyers, had shown that proper training and modified tactics could overcome equipment limitations. But Row 105 was different.
Two senior officers aboard, 17 years combined submarine experience, a crew that had survived repeated American attacks, and a captain who knew the Americans were coming. Row 105 surfaced at 3:10 a.m. on May 31st, 1944. Lieutenant Inu brought the submarine up to periscope depth first. Scan the horizon.
Listen for propeller noise. The ocean appeared empty, dark, silent. The submarine’s batteries needed recharging. 17 days at sea, constant submerged operations. The electric motors had drained the battery banks to 30% capacity. Inu needed at least four hours on the surface running diesel generators to restore full power.
Captain Katoau stood in the conning tower reviewing the intelligence warnings from Sixth Fleet. Five submarines confirmed destroyed between May 19th and May 26th. All killed by the same American weapon, something called a hedgehog, a forwardfiring mortar that detonated on contact with the hull.
Kato had studied American anti-ubmarine tactics throughout the war. Depth charges required the attacking ship to pass over the submarine, created turbulence, gave the submarine time to evade between attacks. But this hedgehog fired forward while the American ship still held sonar contact, landed in a pattern ahead of the submarine’s projected position.
If the submarine maintained course, the weapon killed it. If the submarine evaded, the American ship could fire again immediately. The tactical solution was simple. Stay deep. Change course randomly. never surface in areas where American warships operated, but row 105 needed to recharge batteries, needed to transmit position reports, needed to maintain the patrol station despite the warnings.
USS Hazelwood detected row 105 on radar at 156 a.m. while the submarine was still on the surface. The destroyer immediately radioed the contact to Commander Haynes aboard USS George. Hannes ordered the Hunter killer group to intercept, but Haynes made a decision that would extend the hunt by 25 hours. He ordered England to hold back, to remain in reserve.
USS Hazelwood would make the first attack, then USS Spangler, then USS Rabby, then USS George. England would only attack if all four ships failed. The reasoning was political. England had killed five submarines. The other ships in the task group had killed none. Morale was collapsing. Crews were questioning their abilities.
Officers were requesting transfers. Hannes needed the other ships to prove they could execute successful attacks. USS Hazelwood prosecuted the contact first, dropped depth charges in a standard pattern. The explosions created massive turbulence, royd the water, destroyed sonar contact for 15 minutes.
When the water cleared, row 105 had vanished. Inouay had used the turbulence to escape. Dove to 400 ft, changed course 90°, reduced speed to two knots, let the submarine drift silently while the Americans searched the wrong sector. USS Spangler gained contact 6 hours later. Fired a hedgehog salvo missed.
The pattern landed 200 yd ahead of where row 105 had been 3 minutes earlier. Inaway had changed depth and course again. Spangler fired three more times. All missed. USS Raie attacked next. Seven hedgehog salvos between noon and 1600 hours on May 30th. Every attack missed. Inaway was using every evasion technique the Imperial Navy had developed.
Random depth changes, unpredictable course alterations, speed variations, silent running between maneuvers. USS George tried four attacks. All failed. Commander Haynes had now watched four American warships fire 21 hedgehog salvos and multiple depth charge patterns without scoring a single hit. 504 projectiles expended. Zero kills.
The problem was predictability. Every American attack followed the same sequence. Gain sonar contact. Calculate firing solution. Launch hedgehog. Wait for detonation. When the attack missed, the ship repositioned and tried again. in a way recognized the pattern, understood the timing, knew exactly when to maneuver, but England’s attack procedure was different.
Williamson had modified the timing, changed the firing intervals, predicted evasion zones instead of tracking current position. Five successful kills and eight attacks proved the method worked. At 0700 on May 31st, after 25 hours of failed attacks, Commander Haynes transmitted a message to USS England. four words, direct, frustrated.
Born from watching his task group fail repeatedly while the smallest ship succeeded consistently. The message became famous in Pacific fleet communications logs, widely quoted in postwar submarine warfare analysis, referenced in anti-ubmarine warfare training manuals for decades. Commander Haynes sent, “Oh hell, go ahead, England.
” Pendleton ordered his crew to battle stations. Williamson reviewed the attack geometry one final time. The sonar operator began tracking row 105’s position. The submarine was running at 320 ft, deeper than any previous contact, moving at four knots, changing course every 8 minutes. Captain Ko knew England was coming.
Knew this destroyer escort had killed five submarines in 12 days. Knew the American crew had perfected techniques the other ships could not execute. He ordered Inoui to dive to maximum depth to use every evasion pattern simultaneously to survive the next 30 minutes. England began the attack run at 7:35 a.m. Pendleton held steady course.
Williamson calculated the firing solution. The hedgehog launcher rotated to the target bearing. 24 projectiles waited in their steel cradles. England fired the Hedgehog at 7:36 a.m. on May 31st. 24 projectiles arked forward. The pattern landed in the zone where Williamson predicted row 105 would be 8 seconds after launch.
Not where the submarine was when England fired, where it would be when the projectiles arrived. Six detonations, then four more. The sound echoed differently than previous attacks, deeper, more sustained. Row 105 was at 320 ft. The deepest kill England had attempted. The pressure at that depth magnified the explosive force, breaking up noises followed immediately.
Bulkheads collapsing, hull plates fracturing, internal compartments flooding. At 7:41, exactly 5 minutes after the hedgehog detonations, a massive underwater explosion erupted, the batteries had shorted. The diesel fuel ignited. Row 105 disintegrated. Oil and debris surfaced within 30 minutes. life jackets, wooden fragments, personal effects.
54 Japanese submariners and Captain Ryan Osuk Kato were dead. USS England had killed six Japanese submarines in 12 days. May 19th through May 31st, 1944. No other warship in naval history had achieved that record. Not in World War I, not in World War II, not in any conflict before or since. Six confirmed submarine kills by a single ship in 12 days remained unmatched eight decades later.
The British Royal Navy’s HMS Starling had sunk six German Ubot in 19 days during February 1944, but Starling operated as part of a six ship Hunter killer group. The kills were shared across multiple vessels. England had operated with George and Ra, but England alone had scored every successful hedgehog attack. Commander Haynes transmitted the results to Admiral Hally at third fleet headquarters.
Hollyy forwarded the report to Admiral Nimttz at Pearl Harbor. Nimtt sent it to Washington to the chief of naval operations to Admiral Ernest King. King had been skeptical of destroyer escorts since their introduction, considered them cheap substitutes for real destroyers, expendable convoy escorts without the speed or firepower for serious combat operations.
But England’s performance forced a reassessment. Admiral King sent a personal message to USS England on June 2nd. The message was brief, direct. It became the most famous quote associated with destroyer escort operations in World War II. King wrote, “There’ll always be an England in the United States Navy.
” The promise was sincere. The Navy commissioned a second USS England in 1963, a Lehey class guided missile cruiser designated DLG22, later reclassified as CG22. That ship served through Vietnam and Operation Desert Storm before decommissioning in 1994. But no third USS England has been commissioned since 1994.
Admiral King’s promise remained unfulfilled 32 years later. The name England disappeared from the active fleet roster. The record remained. The promise did not. USS England received the presidential unit citation for the May 1944 operation. One of only three destroyer escorts in World War II to earn that recognition.
Lieutenant Commander Pendleton received the Navy Cross. Lieutenant Williamson received commenation for developing the modified attack procedures. The Bureau of Ordinance increased hedgehog projectile production by 40% in June 1944. Destroyer escorts throughout the Pacific requested installation priority.
Attack procedure manuals based on England’s tactics were distributed fleetwide. Anti-ubmarine warfare training incorporated the lessons learned from the NA line operation. The Japanese Sixth Fleet abandoned submarine picket line tactics after losing six boats in 12 days. The Imperial Navy had deployed 25 submarines across the Pacific in May 1944.
By the end of June, 17 were destroyed. American codereakers, hedgehog weapons, and aggressive hunterkiller tactics had eliminated Japan’s submarine early warning system. The remaining Japanese submarines shifted to supply runs, transporting ammunition and food to isolated garrisons, evacuating wounded personnel, mining harbor approaches.
The offensive submarine warfare campaign effectively ended. Japan’s submarine force spent the rest of the war avoiding contact rather than seeking it. USS England continued anti-ubmarine patrols through the summer of 1944, escorted convoys between Manis and Uli, supported the invasions of Lee and Okinawa.
The ship never achieved another submarine kill. Six submarines in 12 days remained the peak, but England’s war was not finished. On May 9th, 1945, while on radar picket duty off Okinawa, three Japanese dive bombers attacked the ship. England’s anti-aircraft guns shot down the first bomber. The aircraft crashed in flames into England’s starboard side just below the bridge.
The plane’s bomb exploded on impact. 37 crew members were killed or missing. 25 were wounded. England sailed to Lee for temporary repairs, then to Philadelphia for permanent reconstruction, but the war ended before the work was completed. USS England was decommissioned on October 15th, 1945. Sold for scrap on November 26th, 1946.
The most successful anti-ubmarine warship in history lasted less than two years in commission. Lieutenant Commander Pendleton left England in September 1944 with a promotion to commander. He commanded an escort division in Alaska until the war ended. Retired in January 1947 with the rank of captain. Died December 9th, 1972.
Buried at Arlington National Cemetery. Lieutenant Williamson took command of USS England in September 1944. The best reward the Navy could offer, command of the ship he had helped make legendary. The official recognition extended beyond Admiral King’s message and the presidential unit citation. The Navy Department in Washington studied England’s attack reports in detail, analyzed every hedgehog firing sequence, examined every sonar track, reviewed every tactical decision Williamson and Pendleton had made. The Bureau of Ships established new destroyer escort construction priorities. In July 1944, all future Buckleyclass ships would receive hedgehog installations during initial fitting out. Existing destroyer escorts without the weapon received retrofit priority. Ships in Pacific anchorages, ships undergoing repairs,
ships between deployments. By September 1944, 214 destroyer escorts carried hedgehog systems. By December, that number increased to 341. The weapon England had validated became standard equipment across the anti-ubmarine warfare fleet. The tactical procedures Williamson developed became doctrine.
The Pacific Fleet Anti-ubmarine Warfare School at Pearl Harbor incorporated England’s attack geometry into training curricula. Sonar operators learned the modified timing intervals. Fire control officers practiced the prediction calculations. Commanding officers studied the attack reports.
Destroyer escort kill ratios improved immediately. Ships that had struggled for months to achieve successful attacks began sinking submarines consistently. The hedgehog success rate across the Pacific Fleet increased from 6% in April 1944 to 23% by October. Still below England’s 50% performance, but substantially better than traditional depth charge operations.
The intelligence component received equal recognition. Fleet Radio Unit Pacific had provided the operational intelligence that made England’s success possible. The codereakers had identified I-16’s route, had decoded the NA picket line positions, had given Commander Haynes the exact coordinates where Japanese submarines would be waiting.
Admiral Nimtt’s authorized expansion of fruit operations in June 1944, additional crypt analysts, more radio intercept stations, faster decoding procedures. The codereers had proven their value at Midway in 1942. England’s operation in May 1944 demonstrated that tactical intelligence could enable small warships to achieve strategic results.
The Japanese submarine force never recovered from the May losses. 17 submarines destroyed in 6 weeks. Nearly half the boats deployed across the Pacific. The Imperial Navy had planned to use submarines for early warning and reconnaissance to detect American carrier movements to position the combined fleet for a decisive battle.
But the Americans knew Japanese submarine positions before the Japanese commanders did. Code breakers intercepted the deployment orders. Hunter killer groups prosecuted the contacts. The hedgehog killed the submarines. The entire Japanese submarine strategy collapsed. By August 1944, Japanese submarines operated under strict defensive protocols, avoid American warships, minimize radio transmissions, abandon patrol stations if threatened, transport supplies to isolated garrisons.
The offensive submarine campaign was finished. The impact extended to the broader Pacific strategy. American carrier task forces operated with reduced submarine threat. Admiral Hally could move the third fleet without concern for submarine picket lines. The invasions of the Philippines, Euoima, and Okinawa proceeded with minimal submarine interference.
Destroyer escorts proved their worth beyond convoy protection. These cheap warships designed for expendable missions, had demonstrated they could hunt and kill submarines as effectively as fleet destroyers, could operate independently, could execute complex tactical operations, could achieve strategic objectives.
The Navy’s construction priorities shifted accordingly. Destroyer escort production accelerated. More Buckley class ships, more Canonclass ships, more Edsel class ships. By war’s end, the United States had commissioned 563 destroyer escorts, many equipped with hedgehog systems, many trained using procedures developed aboard USS England.
Lieutenant Commander Pendleton’s Navy cross citation specifically mentioned the tactical innovations England had pioneered, the modified attack timing, the prediction-based firing solutions, the aggressive prosecution of contacts despite equipment limitations. The citation became required reading at the Naval War College, but recognition could not change certain realities.
37 men died when the kamicazi hit England on May 9th, 1945. The crew members who had executed those six perfect hedgehog attacks, who had tracked submarines through blind spots, who had maintained equipment under combat conditions. Many of them were gone. The survivors carried the legacy forward, returned to civilian life with stories of 12 days in May 1944 when their small destroyer escort had achieved something no warship before or since had matched.
Six submarines, 12 days, a record that stood unbroken. The hedgehog weapon itself evolved. The Royal Navy developed the squid mortar in late 1943, a three-barreled system that fired larger depth charges with proximity fuses. The United States developed the weapon Alpha in the 1950s, then the ASRock anti-ubmarine rocket.
Each generation built on lessons learned from England’s May 1944 operation. Modern anti-ubmarine warfare relies on homing torpedoes, sonar arrays that detect submarines hundreds of miles away, helicopters that deploy acoustic sensors, nuclearpowered attack submarines that hunt their diesel electric counterparts.
The technology has advanced far beyond the hedgehog mortar. But the fundamental principle remains unchanged. Find the submarine. Attack while still holding contact. Kill before it can evade. USS England proved that principle worked when executed with precision and courage. The question that remained eight decades later was whether the Navy would honor Admiral King’s promise.
Whether a third USS England would join the fleet, whether the name that represented the most successful anti-ubmarine operation in naval history would return to active service, or whether the record would stand alone, unmatched, unforgotten, but without a ship to carry the legacy forward. The physical artifacts of USS England’s 12-day operation are scattered across museums and archives.
The National Museum of the Pacific War in Fredericksburg, Texas, preserves England’s action reports, the detailed attack logs, the sonar tracking charts, the hedgehog firing sequences that demonstrated how a small destroyer escort achieved what larger warships could not. The Naval History and Heritage Command in Washington maintains England’s presidential unit citation.
The original document signed by Navy Secretary James Foresttol. The citation text that describes six submarine kills in 12 days as an unmatched achievement in anti-ubmarine warfare history. Arlington National Cemetery holds the grave of Captain Walton Barlay Pendleton. Section 30, site 766A. The headstone lists his service dates, his rank, his decorations, the Navy Cross, but nothing on the stone mentions the 12 days in May 1944 when his ship rewrote anti-ubmarine warfare doctrine.
Lieutenant John Williamson survived the war, commanded USS England until decommissioning, returned to civilian life. The Navy records show his subsequent assignments, his promotions, his commenations. But the trail goes cold in the 1950s. No public records detail his later life. No interviews preserve his perspective on those 12 days.
The crew members who survived England’s entire deployment scattered across America after demobilization. Returned to farms in Iowa, machine shops in Michigan, fishing boats in Massachusetts. Most never spoke publicly about their service, never gave interviews, never wrote memoirs. The 12 days that made naval history became private memories held by men who had no interest in public recognition.
The Japanese submariners who died aboard I16, row 106, row 104, row 116, row 108, and row 105 are commemorated at Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. 328 men, 14 officers. The Imperial Navy Submarine Service lost 77% of its personnel during World War II. The highest casualty rate of any Japanese naval branch.
The hedgehog weapon that made England’s success possible exists in museum collections worldwide. The Imperial War Museum in London displays a complete launcher assembly. The National Museum of the United States Navy in Washington exhibits hedgehog projectiles. The USS Slater Museum ship in Albany, New York, maintains a functional hedgehog installation on deck.
But no museum displays artifacts specifically from USS England’s May 1944 operation. No hedgehog projectiles recovered from the submarine kills. No equipment salvaged before the ship was scrapped. The physical evidence of the most successful anti-ubmarine patrol in naval history was cut apart and melted down in 1946.
The second USS England served honorably for 31 years, deployed to Vietnam, participated in Operation Desert Storm, earned multiple commendations, but that ship never achieved the fame of the First England, never set records, never rewrote doctrine. The name carried the legacy without matching the achievement.
Admiral King’s promise that there would always be an England in the United States Navy lasted until January 21st, 1994. The second England decommissioned that day. The name disappeared from the active fleet roster. 32 years passed. No third England was commissioned. The record stands unbroken.
Six submarines destroyed by a single warship in 12 days. May 19th through May 31st, 1944. No ship in any Navy has matched that achievement in the 82 years since. Not in World War II, not in Korea, not in the Cold War, not in modern anti-ubmarine operations. The tactical innovations USS England pioneered remain relevant.
Forward-firing weapons that maintain sonar contact during attack. Predictionbased firing solutions that anticipate submarine evasion. Aggressive prosecution of contacts despite initial failures. Modern anti-ubmarine warfare incorporates these principles in systems far more sophisticated than the hedgehog mortar.
The intelligence methods that enabled England’s success evolved into the signals intelligence infrastructure that supported American naval operations through the Cold War and beyond. Fleet radio unit Pacific became the foundation for modern cryptologic warfare. The codereers who decoded Japanese submarine positions in May 1944 established procedures still used eight decades later.
But the human element cannot be replicated. Pendleton’s leadership, Williamson’s tactical innovation, the crew’s discipline under combat conditions, the courage to attack when other ships failed, the precision to kill six times in eight attacks when the weapon was considered experimental. That combination of factors occurred once in May 1944 aboard a 1,400 ton destroyer escort that the Navy considered expendable.
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