The ‘Besieged’ British Submarines That Strangled Rommel—1,000 Miles Inside Enemy Waters D

Malta January, 1941 1,000 miles inside Axis-controlled waters, the island fortress endured constant bombardment. German and Italian aircraft attacked daily. Supply convoys barely reached harbor, yet British submarines operated from caves carved into limestone cliffs. They slipped out at night. They hunted in enemy waters.

They sank the ships keeping Rommel’s army alive. The strategic calculation was simple. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel commanded German and Italian forces in North Africa. His Afrika Korps achieved remarkable victories with limited resources. Fuel from Italian tankers, ammunition from German freighters, food and equipment crossing the Mediterranean from Naples, Taranto, Brindisi.

Every ton delivered meant Rommel could advance. Every ton sunk meant he retreated. British submarines provided the only force capable of sustained operations in those waters. Surface ships risked destruction from land-based aircraft. Carrier strikes required fleet support, unavailable in 1941. Malta-based submarines could patrol for weeks, submerged during day, surfaced at night to recharge batteries, positioned along convoy routes from Italy to Libya, waiting.

The submarines arrived at Malta in different circumstances from standard deployment. The 10th Submarine Flotilla formed officially in January 1941 under Commander George Simpson. His headquarters occupied Lazaretto Creek on Manoel Island. The submarine base had proper name, HMS Talbot. Shore facilities, repair workshops, torpedo storage, fuel depot, everything a submarine force required, except safety from air attack.

U-class submarines formed the flotilla core. 630 tons displacement, 196 feet long, four internal torpedo tubes, maximum surface speed 11.5 knots, submerged speed eight knots, range 3,800 nautical miles at 10 knots. Designed originally as training submarines, pressed into combat service, perfectly suited for Mediterranean operations.

The clear Mediterranean waters made submarine operations dangerous. Aircraft could spot submerged boats from altitude. Diving to safety required fast reactions. U class submarines could reach periscope depth in 45 seconds. Crash dive to 100 ft in under 2 minutes. Italian anti-submarine forces knew these capabilities. They hunted accordingly.

HMS Upholder joined the flotilla in December 1940. Lieutenant Commander Malcolm David Wanklyn commanded, age 29, graduate of Dartmouth Naval College, submarine service since 1933. Given his first command in February 1940. Now leading one of 12 U class submarines at Malta.

His first patrols produced modest results. Superiors questioned whether he possessed the aggressive temperament required. May the 24th, 1941, Wanklyn proved them wrong. Upholder detected a southbound convoy off Sicily. Five destroyers escorted the troop ship Conte Rosso, 17,879 tons, carrying 2,000 Italian soldiers to North Africa.

Heavily defended, well screened, moving fast. Wanklyn pressed the attack. Failing light made periscope observation unreliable. Surface approach risked detection. Upholder’s sonar was malfunctioning. He decided to close to short range anyway. Positioned Upholder ahead of the convoy. Waited until Conte Rosso entered torpedo range.

An escort destroyer suddenly appeared at high speed. Wanklyn barely avoided collision. The destroyer passed within yards, did not spot the submarine. Wanklyn steadied his fired four torpedoes, dove immediately. Conte Rosso took multiple hits, began sinking, destroyers counterattacked, dropped 37 depth charges over 20 minutes.

Upholder survived, escaped, returned to Malta. The Victoria Cross followed, Britain’s highest military decoration for pressing home attack despite overwhelming odds. This established Upholder’s pattern. Between January 1941 and April 1942, Wanklyn completed 24 patrols, sank 93,031 tons of Axis shipping, three Italian submarines, one destroyer, two large troop ships, multiple freighters and tankers, damaged an Italian cruiser.

Every successful patrol disrupted Rommel’s supply lines further. September 18th, 1941. Upholder intercepted another major convoy east of Tripoli. Three troop ships, Neptunia, Oceania, Vulcania, each 19,000 tons, six destroyer escorts. Wanklyn penetrated the screen at night, fired four torpedoes from 5,000 yards, scored three hits.

Neptunia and Oceania both struck. Wanklyn surfaced after the escorts departed, finished Neptunia with two more torpedoes. 8 minutes from hit to sinking, 400 troops lost, 6,000 reached Libya instead of 7,000. The 10th Flotilla never numbered more than 12 submarines simultaneously, yet between January 1941 and December 1942, this small force sank 412,575 tons of Axis shipping.

Churchill recognized the strategic impact. In his memoirs, he wrote that during 3 months ending September 1941, British forces sank 43 Axis ships, totaling 150,000 tons. In October, over 60% of Rommel’s supplies sank in transit. Malta itself suffered terribly. The Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica bombed the island constantly during 1941 and 42.

More bombs fell on Malta than on London during the Blitz. The submarine base at Manoel Island received priority targeting. Bombs struck the docks, workshops, fuel storage. Submarines in harbor submerged to the bottom to avoid damage. Crews lived underground, ate from diminishing rations, operated in conditions that should have prevented any combat effectiveness.

If you’re finding this analysis of British submarine operations interesting, subscribing helps the channel continue detailed research like this. The conditions demanded remarkable endurance. Submarines left Malta at night, navigated north toward Italian convoy routes, submerged at dawn, remained underwater all day, surfaced only at night to recharge batteries and ventilate the boat.

Air inside became foul after 16 hours submerged. Carbon dioxide accumulated. Oxygen depleted. Crews functioned despite growing fatigue. Patrols lasted 3 to 4 weeks. Some extended to 50 days when hunting proved productive. Combat added psychological pressure. Depth charge attacks were frequent. Italian and German escorts dropped charges aggressively.

Upholder survived 38 charges after sinking a cruiser, 48 charges in 8 minutes after sinking a tanker. Each explosion felt like a hammer blow against the hull. Equipment shattered. Lights failed. Men waited in darkness wondering if the next charge would crush the pressure hull. HMS Urge, under Lieutenant Commander Edward Tomkinson, achieved success comparable to Upholder, sank 74,669 tons of shipping, torpedoed the Italian cruiser Giovanni delle Bande Nere, damaged the battleship Vittorio Veneto, lost April 1942 striking a mine while evacuating Malta to Alexandria. All hands lost including war correspondent Bernard Gray. The strategic impact exceeded the tonnage figures. Rommel complained constantly about supply shortages. German General Staff noted in late 1942

that the enemy had recognized sea communications as the weak point in North Africa operations. Defense against submarines was barely sufficient. Against air attack inadequate. Rommel’s fuel and munitions remained scarce throughout critical battles. By mid-1942, Axis forces faced unsustainable losses.

Malta submarines accounted for significant percentage. Surface forces from Malta contributed more. Royal Air Force bombers struck convoys when weather permitted. Combined effect strangled Rommel’s logistics. The Africa Corps won tactical victories, lost the strategic campaign. Supply failures caused defeat as much as British ground forces did.

The cost to British submarine force was heavy. The 10th Flotilla lost multiple boats. HMS Upholder disappeared April 14, 1942 overdue from her 25th patrol, likely struck Italian minefield north of Tripoli. All 31 crew lost including Malcolm Wanklyn. The Admiralty issued unusual tribute, noted that it was seldom proper to distinguish individual services, made exception for Upholder, stated the ship and her company inspired not only their Flotilla, but the entire fleet and Malta itself.

Overall, British submarine operations in all theaters demonstrated sustained effectiveness. 3,000 patrols completed during the war. British submarines sank 158 enemy combatant ships, damaged 54 more, destroyed 1,670,122 tons of merchant shipping. Mediterranean operations alone accounted for 1,041,570 tons.

Four cruisers, eight destroyers, 21 submarines, nine other warships sunk by British and Allied submarines in Mediterranean theater. The Malta submarines represented strategic economy of force. Small number of vessels, minimal support infrastructure, operating from besieged base under constant attack, yet achieving disproportionate impact.

German U-boats never faced similar conditions. They operated from secure French bases, received comprehensive support, still achieved less strategic effect per submarine than Malta’s fighting 10th. Comparative analysis reveals British submarine advantages. Better training, superior damage control, more aggressive tactics.

British submarine commanders pressed attacks despite heavy escort. German U-boat commanders increasingly avoided strong defenses after 1943. British submarines operated effectively in shallow, clear Mediterranean waters. German U-boats struggled in same conditions. The difference came from doctrine and training rather than technology.

Malta submarines proved submarines work best as commerce raiders rather than fleet units. Hunting merchant shipping produced measurable strategic results. Waiting to ambush enemy capital ships wasted potential. The Royal Navy learned this lesson, applied it systematically. Malta submarines focused exclusively on supply lines.

Let surface forces handle warship engagements when possible. The division of labor maximized effectiveness. April 1942 marked the flotilla’s peak effectiveness. Rommel’s supply situation approached crisis. Then Axis forces intensified Malta bombing. Submarine losses increased. The flotilla temporarily relocated to Alexandria in mid-1942, returned to Malta once air situation improved, never regained the same concentration of force.

By 1943, improved Allied air power and surface forces shared the interdiction mission. Submarines remained important. No longer carried the burden alone. Post-war analysis confirmed Malta submarines changed the Mediterranean campaign outcome. Rommel’s defeats at El Alamein stemmed partly from fuel shortages.

British submarines and aircraft caused those shortages. Every ton of fuel that never reached North Africa meant fewer German tanks operating. Every ammunition ship sunk reduced Axis artillery effectiveness. The tonnage war worked. Malta submarines proved it worked. Only one significant Malta submarine survives as memorial.

The memory, the example, the inspiration remain. 31 men aboard Upholder died April 14, 1942. They never knew their contribution helped win the Mediterranean. Never saw Rommel retreat. Never learned their sacrifices mattered strategically. The Royal Navy ensured everyone else knew.

The unique Admiralty tribute to Upholder crew stated simply, “The ship and her company are gone. The example and inspiration remain. Malta submarines operated from a base that shouldn’t have existed, under siege, under bombardment, undermanned, undersupplied. They still hunted. They still sank ships.

They still changed the strategic balance. British submarine force sank over 1 million tons of Axis shipping in the Mediterranean. The 10th flotilla at Malta accounted for 412,000 tons. 12 submarines, 16 months of peak operations, strategic impact far beyond their numbers. The crews understood what they faced.

Every patrol might be the last. Depth charges, mines, aircraft bombs while in harbor, starvation if convoys failed to reach Malta. They accepted the risks, volunteered for additional patrols, maintained equipment under impossible conditions. That dedication made the difference. Not superior technology, not overwhelming numbers.

Human determination operating excellent submarines against critical targets. That was British naval excellence under impossible conditions. That was Malta’s fighting 10th.